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Abstract
Civil conflicts are complex: multiple warring parties compete for control of territory
both against each other and the government. These processes are often dynamic; changing
over time and space. In this study, we embrace these complexities through a network
based approach. By considering important relational patterns, such as reciprocity and
transitivity, and tying them together with existing theoretical developments in the conflict
processes literature, we answer the question of ‘who fights whom and when’ during civil
conflict. Further, using the case of Nigeria, we offer novel theoretical insights about how
the entrance of a new, aggressive actor can decisively alter the trajectory of conflict. In
addition, we show that our approach is better at predicting ‘who fights whom and when’
in an out-of-sample context than extant approaches.
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Introduction
Who fights whom during civil conflict? Historically, efforts to understand violence
between armed actors during civil conflicts focus on explaining why an armed actor vio-
lently mobilizes against the government. But the rebel-government paradigm is limited,
as evidenced by the growing number of scholars who now theorize about the implications
of multi-party civil wars (Cunningham, 2006; Akcinaroglu, 2012). Despite these advances,
these studies are rooted in a dyadic research design, which examines pairs of relationships
as independent phenomena and does not consider conflict between actors as a part of
an interdependent conflict system. Because of this, current research has yet to provide
a full consideration of the interconnected multi-actor dynamics that characterize recent
examples of intrastate conflicts; a notable restriction not only given recent theoretical
developments in the literature but also considering that by 2003 over 30% of ongoing civil
wars involved multiple dyads in conflict with one another (Harbom et al., 2008).
In this study we explain how overlooking interdependence in civil wars leads to a mis-
representation of the full story of who fights whom during violent conflict. Recent history
highlights this reality: in Syria, the entry of ISIS led to an increase in violence between
pro-Assad forces and a number of armed actors in the region (Beauchamp, 2014; Schmitt,
2018). In Mexico, the rise and fall of the aggressive and powerful Sinaloa Cartel gener-
ated violence between other drug trafficking organizations across the country (La Rosa
& Shirk, 2018). Similarly, understanding the path of violence between the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and government forces is incomplete without a careful
examination of the FARC’s violent clashes with right-wing paramilitary groups (Alesma,
2015). Without research based on both theoretical and empirical considerations of inter-
dependence, we miss how interactions between one pair of actors can affect other actors
across the system. Further, as we show in this study, ignoring interdependencies generates
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inaccurate predictions about the occurrence of conflict, and, critically, leads researchers
to misidentify which actors are most likely to be involved in violence during a conflict.
We argue that an investigation into the dynamic, complex relational structure of armed
actors is needed to understand who fights whom during intrastate conflicts. Our position
is founded on scholarship concerned with the evolution of conflict processes, such as
research by Tilly (1985) and Moore (1995). Importantly, these scholars suggest that
group-level attributes of armed actors only partially explain armed group behavior and
that the interactions between groups over time can provide a more complete insight into
why actors fight one another. We demonstrate the value of this perspective by showing
how accounting for group level interactions generates a more complete understanding of
conflict.
To systematize the interactions between armed actors, we conceptualize armed actors
and battles as nodes and linkages in a network wherein the actors and their relationships
change over time. This framework allows us to estimate the relationships that evolve
between actors within a conflict network in order to predict the occurrence of battles
between groups. We employ this network approach in order to investigate civil conflict
in Nigeria. The network based approach significantly outperforms traditional dyad-group
approaches at predicting the occurrence of battles between groups in an out-of-sample
context in the case of Nigeria.1 Our findings yield theoretical implications for the study
of civilian victimization and conflict occurrence, as well as insights about how the entrance
of particularly aggressive actors can decisively alter the trajectory of conflict.
1In the appendix, we show that our model also outperforms machine learning classifiers such as
random forests.
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Strategic Fighting and Network Emergence
In this study, we investigate the formation and evolution of what we term the civil
conflict network. This network is the product of strategic actions by both government and
armed non-governmental actors. Below we discuss how this network emerges from armed
actors’ motivations and sources of power, what we gain by understanding relational pat-
terns such as reciprocity and transitivity, and how actor composition influences violence
across the civil conflict network overtime.
To understand the emergence of the conflict network, it is useful to start by looking
at the motivations of the actors that make up this network – the government and rebel
groups. We follow Collier & Hoeﬄer (2004) in claiming that rebel actions are driven
by a combination of material factors (the desire to gain additional resources, rents, or
otherwise enrich the group and its leaders); and ideological factors–the desire to change
public policy and shift the benefits towards particular economic, social, ethnic or religious
groups (see also Gurr, 1970; Regan & Norton, 2005; Bodea & Elbadawi, 2007).2 Note
that this is not an either or distinction. Groups are often motivated by both a desire for
resources and policy changes, but some groups value ideology more than material goods,
and vice versa. Importantly, it is quite difficult to observe the mix of motivations for
an armed actor. Conversely, the government is motivated principally by the desire to
remain in power and secondarily to enrich themselves and their winning coalition (Bueno
de Mesquita et al., 2005; Goemans, 2000; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001).
These motivations provide incentives for groups to attack other armed groups. This
can manifest as conflict between one rebel group and another, or as fighting between
the government and non-state armed groups. A rebel group that is motivated by re-
2Of course many policies focus on distribution of scarce resources, but we believe there is value in the
distinction between groups seeking short term material gains, and those seeking policy changes.
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sources might attack not just the government, but other rebel groups in order to increase
their abilities to control rents or lootable resources. Ideological motivation could drive
groups to attack the government in hopes of either toppling the government in order to
directly control policy or attacking to impose costs and indirectly obtain policy conces-
sions. Ideologically motivated groups might also attack rebel groups that draw support
from different sections of society in order to shift support away from challenger groups
in a territory. Similarly, the government also has a number of incentives to attack rebel
groups – attacking strong rebel groups reduces the likelihood those groups can defeat the
government, but governments also attack to control resources and suppress challengers’
abilities to interact violently (through predation) or nonviolently (through public goods
provision) with the civilian population.
In order to attack other groups, rebels rely on the ability to mobilize resources. They
can do this by mobilizing or taxing the civilian population (Kalyvas, 2006) or through
the sale of so called “lootable” goods like alluvial diamonds, narcotics, or tropical timber
(Ross, 2004; Lujala et al., 2005; de Soysa, 2000). Alternatively, they can gain resources
from foreign supporters – generally, those that are opposed to the central government
(Gleditsch, 2007; Regan, 2002b,a).
Armed actors and their actions, driven by their motivations and resources, constitute
the civil conflict network. In this network the nodes are the different armed groups – both
rebel and government – and the links are battles between armed groups. This network
is not static over time. New groups are created, groups split into rivals, and groups
demobilize and leave the network. Similarly, groups are not constant in their behavior
over time and thus might fight each other in one time period yet fight a common enemy
in another.
A stylized representation of a dynamic network is shown below. In Figure 1, the
nodes represent armed actors and the ties represent battles between armed actors. The
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graphic highlights several important features relevant to our study. Each panel represents
a different phase, or new year, of the conflict. In each year, new armed actors might
enter or exit the conflict (i.e., an armed group could stop fighting or dissolve). In the
visualization, new entrants are shaded in grey. Second, new ties can form between actors
in any period, but ties can also disappear over time. For example, moving from panel 1
to panel 2 we can see that some of the linkages in the first time period no longer appear
in the second time period, which indicates that two actors that fought in the first time
period are not fighting in the second time period. These features demonstrate the type
of information that a network conceptualization of conflict development can provide.
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Figure 1: Stylized network graphic depicting changing connections between actors over time,
directed linkages, and community clusters.
Network Patterns in Intrastate Conflict
In this section we explain how dependence patterns echo insights from the literature on
rebel groups and civil conflict. We review three main types of dependencies and describe
our expectations for how these will influence violence in the civil conflict network.
First Order Dependencies
In the civil conflict network, some actors are more likely to fight than others due to
their group-level characteristics. In the studies of networks, these are called first-order
dependencies, and much of the study of rebel group behavior focuses on these kinds of
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factors.3 In particular, ceteris paribus, certain groups are going to be more likely to attack
other groups, and certain groups are going to be more likely to be attacked based on group
level attributes.
Many of these first order dependencies stem from a group’s motivations or their re-
sources. For example, Weinstein (2007) argues that rebel groups with more ideologically
motivated followers are thought to be less violent than groups whose members are moti-
vated by greed. The motivation of group members, then, is a latent, unobserved attribute
that accounts for why one rebel group is more prone to attack other groups. Additionally,
groups that adhere to an exclusionary ideology – or an ideology that is center-seeking
rather than secessionist – will be more likely to attack across the network to advance
their agenda. Another example of first order dependence is when a contextual feature of
the group makes it more likely to be a target. For instance, if a group possesses territory
with valuable natural resources, they are more likely to be attacked by groups that are
more motivated by resources.
While some of these factors can be controlled for in the context of a standard re-
gression model, many of them are either contextual or difficult to observe and measure.
This creates serious challenges for understanding who fights whom and when during civil
conflicts. If two groups fight, it might be because one of the groups is particularly aggres-
sive, or the other group is a particularly appealing target, and failing to account for these
first order dependencies will lead to inappropriately assigning credit for the confrontation,
and a biased understanding of the sources of violence. A network approach allows us to
both appropriately account for actor-level effects, or first-order dependencies, without di-
3For just a few examples see Weinstein (2007) on organizational structure leading to different levels
of violence, Wucherpfennig et al. (2012) on how ethnic power relations makes certain rebel groups more
cost tolerant, Buhaug et al. (2009) on rebel capacity and goals.
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rectly measuring whether ideology or religion or resources are driving these effects. While
measuring this is undoubtedly important and relevant to the study of conflict, testing
hypotheses on these characteristics has already been a primary focus of existing theoret-
ical and empirical work. Our aim is to move one step beyond these first order factors to
explore relational dimensions of the conflict system.
Second Order Dependencies
Networks of civil conflict are not created only by the attributes of armed groups, they
are also a consequence of armed groups’ actions. Condra & Shapiro (2010) and Lyall
(2009) have explored how armed groups affect the tendency of their targets to be violent
in the future, and many scholars have examined how rebel groups respond to violence
with violence (Kathman & Wood, 2015). However, few studies have fully explored the
consequences of armed group actions (and interactions) to explain fighting during civil
wars.
One of the most important ways that conflicts evolve is through reciprocity and re-
taliation (Moore, 1995).4 If one armed group attacks another, it is more likely to be
attacked itself. Some of this behavior is not causal. If a latent characteristic of the group
leads actor A to attack B, it is also more likely to lead B to attack A. At the same time,
dynamics of civilian support can also encourage reciprocity. If a group does not respond
to attacks against it, it risks being seen as weak, which can lead to a loss of support from
civilians or foreign sponsors. For groups relying on civilians, the need for retaliation can
be especially stark, as one of the reasons civilians might support an armed group is for
protection from others (Kalyvas, 2006; Valentino et al., 2004).
4Though reciprocity is an underdeveloped concept as applied to intrastate conflict, reciprocity has
been a popular topic in the International Relations literature for decades. For example, see Richardson
(1960); Dorff & Minhas (2017).
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Accounting for reciprocity in a conflict network improves our ability to understand
many dynamics of civil conflict. It becomes difficult to parse the factors that cause
groups to attack and to be targeted if we ignore the fact that some attacks are retaliatory
in nature. More generally, understanding reciprocity during civil conflict underscores that
conflicts are not static: the actions and reactions passed between groups play a crucial
role in shaping the contours of civil conflict.
Third Order Dependencies
We posit that another form of dependency is relevant to explain conflict in the conflict
network. Importantly, there are ways in which the motivations, resources, and actions
of groups affect not just their targets, but also unrelated pairs of actors. In the network
literature, this is termed “third-order dependencies,” where the relationship between A
and B are linked with the relationship between B and C, and the relation between A and
C. Two particular ways in which this instantiate are homophily and stochastic equivalence.
Armed actors’ motivations often lend themselves to homophily or heterophily – the
tendency of groups that share a latent trait to interact more or less. Homophily (and
heterophily) themselves cause networks to have greater (lesser) levels of transitivity and
clusterability. Groups that are primarily ideologically motivated are more likely to attack
armed actors that are not ideologically similar (the same holds for ethnic or religious mo-
tivations). Similarly, groups that are primarily motivated by desire for material resources
are more likely to fight geographically proximate groups rather than distant ones. Ac-
cordingly, we should also observe that groups with similar resource bases fight each other
in an effort to monopolize access to those resources.
The second type of third order dependency that we expect to influence conflict is
stochastic equivalence. Stochastic equivalence captures the tendency for actors to behave
similarly in the conflict network. A very straightforward example of this is when groups
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are sponsored by the same foreign actor. In this case, groups are going to be unlikely
to fight each other and more likely to fight the government (Bapat & Bond, 2012). A
similar dynamic occurs when rebel groups have actual alliances, whether competitive or
otherwise (Zeigler, 2016), and these alliances are formed for strategic reasons Christia
(2012). When groups have similar ideological motivations or strategic positions, they
are not only unlikely to fight each other, but they are also incentivized to select similar
targets. Finally, when ideological groups have secessionist aims, they could be expected to
be stochastically equivalent since they would be most likely to fight the central government
and not geographically proximate groups.
Taken in concert, we have argued that these types of social structure – actor effects,
reciprocity, homophily and stochastic equivalence – influence the likelihood of violence
between actors in the conflict network. Importantly, these first, second, and third order
effects intuitively reflect theoretical perspectives found in the existing scholarship on civil
war and rebel group behavior. Our study unites these two literatures and demonstrates the
importance of combining substantive theories of violent behavior with network approaches.
Actor Entry
An important and under discussed aspect of civil conflict is that actors are not static.
Armed groups can enter or exit the civil conflict network at any given time. As Kathman
& Wood (2015, p. 168) have argued “conflict systems are fluid, and competition varies
in response to the arrival or exit of violent combat groups. . . ”, thus the entry of particu-
larly strong or aggressive groups can have violent ripple effects across the entire conflict
network. Perhaps the easiest way a group can affect the conflict network is by directly
interacting with other groups, but this is not the limit of their impact. We argue that the
presence of a group (call them group A) can increase the likelihood of conflict between
two separate groups (group B and C). The two main ways that an actor’s entry influences
9
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the behavior of other groups is by effecting the capabilities and actions of the government
and altering the system-wide distribution of resources.5
When a new group enters a conflict it of course forms direct relationships with ex-
isting armed groups. These relationships could be ‘enemy’ relationships if the group is
ideologically opposed to existing groups or is a competitor for scarce resources. The new
group could be ‘friendly’ if they are ideologically similar to existing groups or if they have
a common enemy (often the government). Or these groups could have a ‘neutral’ entry –
for example if the new group is a secessionist movement that faces few competitor rebels
groups and primarily fights the government. These types of direct effects – wherein one
actor’s behavior directly influences another actor – can be accommodated within standard
dyadic designs. We argue, however, that in addition to these effects, important indirect
processes also emerge from the entry of a new actor.
A new entrant to the system that clashes with the government can significantly increase
the level of conflict in the network. Clearly, this is in part because the new violent group
is directly involved in conflict, but this group can also spur violence between other armed
groups. The entry of a new violent group that targets the government has two possible
effects on the conflict network. First, the new group’s entry could strain, and ultimately
decrease, government resources and capabilities. This weakens the government’s ability
to provide security and deter violence from other armed groups, even ‘neutral’ ones.
Secondly, when a new armed group successfully defeats government actors in a given
5Note that the selection of groups who enter an ongoing conflict is going to be different than those
groups that are willing to rebel in a peacetime context. In particular, with an ongoing conflict, the
opportunity cost for groups to take up arms is lower than it would be at peacetime, and the prospects for
survival and success should be higher than if the group faced the consolidated power of the government.
Thus, we do not have reason to believe that groups who enter an ongoing conflict will, by their nature,
be stronger or more violent, though this should be the subject of cross-national investigation.
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region or battle, this harms the government’s reputation and makes them appear more
vulnerable. Thus, if the government does not want to embolden other challengers (Walter,
2006) it will try to overcompensate for its’ loss and demonstrate strength by fighting
heavily against armed actors.
The entry of a new group can also affect the actions of other rebels based on those
rebels’ sources of support. In particular, the entrance of a new group might displace
existing groups. This potentially leads groups into conflict with each other over scarce
resources and lootable goods. At the same time, when a new group that is particularly
strong and aggressive enters the conflict it could ignite a process of outbidding among
‘friendly’ groups for the support of the civilian population. Civilians might be drawn to
support the new ‘successful’ group, following the dynamics discussed by Bloom (2004),
Nemeth (2014), and Toft (2003).
In sum, the entrance of powerful or violent rebel groups into the conflict network
can radically change the status quo. The conflict network is not only altered because of
the direct relationships the new group forms, but because its entrance will also have an
effect on how others actors relate to each other. Specifically, these groups can influence
perceptions and capabilities of the government and they also force other rebel groups to be
increasingly aggressive in chasing scarce resources. This is most likely to occur when the
new group is both strong enough to displace existing groups or challenge the government,
and aggressive enough to actually do so. Thus, even when we account for new groups’
first order tendencies towards violence, we expect to see their entry associated with a
higher level of violence in the overall conflict system.
Case Selection: The Conflict[s] in Nigeria
To demonstrate the utility of a network approach to studying civil conflict, and to
evaluate the effects of the entry of a particularly aggressive actor (Boko Haram), we turn
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to the case of Nigeria. Over the past decade and a half, the people of Nigeria have
experienced violence through ethnic and religious group tensions, organized insurgency,
and government repression. These complexities make Nigeria a representative case for
understanding the phenomena we are interested in, i.e. how network dynamics influence
violence between actors. In this section, we describe Nigeria’s conflict landscape and
summarize the nature of warfare between multiple armed actors, government agents, and
civilians.
The year 2000 marks the beginning of a critically tense transition period in Nigeria.
Following the 1999 presidential election of Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria’s 15-year long mil-
itary dictatorship ends. Meanwhile, a resurgent Islamic political movement consolidates
influence in Nigeria’s predominantly Muslim northern states. Sharia Law, a penal code in
effect for hundreds of years in Nigeria but disbanded in 1960, is re-implemented following
the 2000 elections. The implementation of Sharia law then leads to numerous riots and
clashes, largely between Muslims and Christians (one clash, in Nigeria’s second largest
city of Kano, ends with over 100 dead in October of 2001).6
President Obasanjo faces many more violent episodes during his first term. As Christian-
Muslim disputes continue in the Northern regions, a tribal war foments in the eastern-
central state of Benue. Thousands of people are forced to flee the area, and troops
reportedly target unarmed civilians in retaliation for the abduction of nearly 20 soldiers.
Continuing Christian-Muslim clashes in the north mark Obasanjo’s second term (begin-
ning in 2003) as well as deepening violence in the Niger Delta where militants vie for
control of oil production centers. Fighting in the Okere district of Warri occurs between
Itsekiris and Urhobos over contentious primary elections held for the Delta South district.
Reports state that government forces attempt to suppress violence through execution-style
6See http://articles.latimes.com/2001/oct/16/news/mn-57819.
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killings. The Nigerian Red Cross reports that more than 6,000 people are displaced as
result of the fighting.7
Mohammed Yusuf emerges in the early 2000s as the radical leader of the religious ex-
tremist group, the Boko Haram.8 Yusuf spreads an anti-state, anti-elite ideology couched
in Sunni Muslim teachings. Conflict in the northern region of Nigeria continues along
religious lines, and by 2008 Boko Haram has grown increasingly well organized, operating
as a mini-state with institutions, a welfare system, and religious police. Clashes between
Boko Haram and state security forces gain momentum as the 2009 uprising begins in
the state of Bauchi and spreads to Borno, Yobe, and Kano. These battles are the first
sustained conflict between Boko Haram and the government; these clashes culminate in
the death of scores of police officers, more than 700 members of Boko Haram, and the
capture of Mohammed Yusuf.9
Vice President Goodluck Jonathan succeeds to the presidency following the death
of his predecessor in 2010. The death of Yusuf, killed by police in a raid, leads to an
intensification of tactics by Boko Haram, including greater violence against civilians.
Demonstratively, in December of 2010, Boko Haram bombs kill an estimated 80 people
in the central city of Jos. This event sparks a response from opposing Christians leading
to roughly 200 more deaths.10 Attacks on civilians continue and in April of 2014 Boko
Haram chooses a target that sparks international condemnation: 276 Chibok schoolgirls.
Though this is not the first time that civilians organize against the insurgency’s violent
tactics, high levels of protest and vigilantism ensue following the children’s kidnapping.
7See https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/nigeria1103/3.htm for more details.
8There is evidence that the early leadership of the movement formed around 2000 or 2002, though
in many reports the fully armed, organized, radical group forms closer to the year 2008 following a clash
with government forces. See Walker (2016) for details.
9See http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/09/world/boko-haram-fast-facts/.
10See http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/09/201397155225146644.html.
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Battles between Boko Haram, local militant groups, and security forces continue to-
day. While Boko Haram has evolved as perhaps the most well known armed insurgent
movement in Nigeria, there are major ethnic militias such as the Urhobo Ethnic Mili-
tia that engage in localized battles and groups such as MEND which battle with other
armed actors and the government over natural resources. MEND is one of the largest mil-
itant groups in the Niger Delta region. The militant organization is expressly concerned
with the public and private production of oil in the local area. Despite these important
armed actors, Boko Haram’s entrance into the conflict network in 2009 has had unique
consequences on the stability of the entire region.
Figure 2 shows the spatial distribution of violence in Nigeria from 2001 to 2016, points
in red represent Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) battle events
in which Boko Haram is involved (either as the initiator or target) while points in blue
designate events that do not involve Boko Haram. Boko Haram’s entrance into the system
corresponds to an increase in both the level and spread of conflict. The increase in
conflict is not attributable to just the violent actions of Boko Haram, instead other actors
engage in more conflictual events. Figure 3 further highlights the complexity of Nigeria’s
conflict and the relevance of relationships between actors: the Fulani Militia is central to
the network, as is (understandably) the Nigerian police and military forces. Reciprocal
conflictual relations are also visible, such as between the Boko Haram and the Military.
14
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Confict Involving Boko Haram? Yes No
Figure 2: Spatial distribution of conflict in Nigeria from 2001 to 2016. Points colored in blue
represent conflict events between sets of actors not including Boko Haram, and points in red
events that do involve Boko Haram as either the initiator or target of conflict.
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Figure 3: Network graph depicting battles between actors for the entire 2000-2016 time period.
Pairs of actors experiencing more conflict have thicker links and arrows indicate direction of ties.
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Data
To study intrastate conflict patterns in Nigeria we utilize the ACLED dataset devel-
oped by Raleigh et al. (2010). This dataset records armed conflict and protest events in
over 60 developing countries. ACLED’s battles data is used to generate our measure of
conflict where yij,t = 1 indicates that a conflict occurred when actor i attacked actor j
at time t (yij,t = 0 if no conflict occurred).
11,12 We focus only on armed groups that are
engaged in battles for at least 5 years during the 2000-2016 period, which results in a
total of 37 armed groups. 13
The groups included in our battle-data analysis are politically violent actors in Nigeria
as defined by the ACLED codebook. Such actors include rebels, militias, and ethnic
groups.14 Additionally, we use secondary resources to confirm the existence of each actor
in the data. Overall, the data capture several key types of actors: government armed forces
(military and police), insurgent groups (Boko Haram), and ethnic militias (including the
11In the appendix, we show results when only including battles from ACLED that resulted in at least
one battle death. The results when using a fatality threshold and not are similar, thus we focus on the
latter for the remainder of this paper.
12Some scholars have noted that the ACLED conflict data should be understood as defining symmetric
events, since who started a particular battle can at times be difficult to entangle. In the appendix, we
show that the results presented in the paper are robust to utilizing a directed or undirected formulation.
13In comparison to other data sets used to analyze armed groups, such as the UCDP data, the ACLED
data has a higher number of armed actors recorded per year. This seems to be driven in part by the
different methodologies underlining each database. For example, the UCDP data records groups that
commit a specific threshold of violence during a battle, whereas ACLED data contains information about
all groups relevant to all battles, regardless of the number of deaths incurred. For this reason, especially
because of our focus on groups entering and leaving the conflict network, our analysis uses the ACLED
data.
14For detailed definitions of these actors, see the on-line ACLED Africa data codebook maintained at
www.acleddata.com.
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Yoruba and Fulani Militias). 15
The ACLED data also allows us to explore civilians’ role in shaping conflict within
the Nigerian system. Building on the research agenda motivated by macro-level studies
(Tarrow, 1994; Tucker, 2007; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011), we investigate the link between
civilian mobilization and violence between armed actors at the local level by creating a
count of the number of protests/riots led by civilians against a given actor at time t− 1.
While there is a robust debate over what causes civilian victimization,16 discussion of
the consequences of civilian victimization, particularly as they relate to the potential
for future conflict has been more limited (Hultman, 2007; Raleigh, 2012). Berman &
Matanock (2015) argue that when rebels groups [governments] kill civilians, other civilians
are more [less] likely to share information with the government: information allows the
government to carry out attacks against insurgents, and the lack of information makes
insurgent attacks less likely. Condra & Shapiro (2012) find support for this relationship
in Iraq. To test for both of these dynamics, we create a count of the number of violent
actions that an actor committed against civilians at time t − 1 and nodal covariates to
explain both the probability of an actor sending and receiving a conflictual tie.
15The country box need not be the boundary for what constitutes a system. Our focus on this
paper is in particular understanding the conflict network in Nigeria. However, if one wanted to study
the conflict system in the Horn of Africa then the boundary of the system would encompass many
countries. Important methodological concerns arise, however, when trying to study such a complex
system. Particularly, one would need to carefully consider that the network potentially has a hierarchical
structure. Specifically, a small rebel group on the coast of Somalia would be quite unlikely to interact
with a rebel group in the south-west of Ethiopia. There are a number of ways of dealing with this type of
issue, one could include fixed parameters to account for the geographic location of actors. Alternatively,
one could generalize the model that we present here to account for those hierarchies through an additional
random effects layer.
16See Humphreys & Weinstein (2006); Downes (2006); Kalyvas (2006); Prorok & Appel (2014).
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Additionally, we attempt to account for spatial effects in modeling the likelihood of
conflict between a particular pair of actors. First, we add a measure of how dispersed
a rebel group’s activity is across the country. Armed groups whose actions are more
dispersed across Nigeria are more likely to come into conflictual contact with others. We
include a “Geographic Spread” variable as both a sender and receiver covariate.17 Second,
we add a measure of neighboring conflict to control for the notable literature that has
developed explicating the mechanisms through which civil conflict can diffuse between
countries.18 To estimate this effect, we use the ACLED dataset to count the number of
conflict events occurring within Nigeria’s contiguous neighbors.
We add three other covariates to the model.19 First, we create a control for whether
both actors are a part of the government (the Police and Military). We include this
control to account for the fact that the probability of an interaction between these two
is minimal relative to the other potential dyads in this system. Second, we include a
binary variable that takes on the value of one if the following year is an election year
and zero otherwise. The election year indicator is included since elections in Nigeria are
rarely waged peacefully in the ballot box, but instead are typically followed or preceded by
episodes of conflict. Most importantly, to examine the affect that Boko Haram’s entrance
has had on the level of conflict in this system we include a binary variable that takes on the
value of one after the Boko Haram insurgency has begun (in 2009) and zero beforehand.20
17For example, to model the spread of group i in period t, we calculate this by taking all the events
involving group i in the 3 years prior to t and estimate the variance.
18See Salehyan & Gleditsch (2007); Metternich et al. (2017); Braithwaite (2010); Beardsley (2011).
19Our covariate selection is limited because the ACLED data does not contain group-level character-
istics for each armed group. Due to our time period of interest, we also cannot use other data sets such
as the Non-State Actor Data (Cunningham et al., 2009) which ends in 2013.
20We choose this date both because 2009 is considered the beginning of the Boko Haram insurgency
in most media reports.
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Modeling Approach
To estimate conflict in this system in a way that explicitly models interdependencies
between actors, we rely on a network based approach that combines the social relations
regression model (SRRM)21 and the latent factor model (LFM). Together the SRRM pro-
vides a set of additive effects to capture first and second order dependencies, and the
latent factor model provides a set of multiplicative effects to model third order dependen-
cies (Minhas et al., 2018). This estimator is referred to as the additive and multiplicative
effects (AME) model:
yij,t = g(θij,t)
θij,t = β
>
d Xij,t + β
>
s Xi,t + β
>
r Xj,t + eij,t
eij,t = ai + bj + ij + α(ui,vj) , where
α(ui,vj) = u
>
i Dvj =
∑
k∈K
dkuikvjk
(1)
where yij,t represents whether or not conflict occurred between actor i (the sender) and
actor j (the receiver) at time t. To model our binary dependent variable we employ a
latent variable representation of a probit regression framework, in which we model a latent
variable, θij, using a set of time varying dyadic (β
>
d Xij,t), sender (β
>
s Xi,t), and receiver
covariates (β>r Xj,t).
To be able to assess the effect that the entrance of actors such as Boko Haram have
on the Nigerian conflict network, we extend the AME framework to handle networks in
which the composition of actors change over time.22 Typically, when employing a latent
21For an example application of this model, see Dorff & Minhas (2017).
22This extension is one reason why we choose not to use the Exponential Random Graph Model
(ERGM). The ERGM framework requires that the set of actors remain constant over time, and so using
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variable framework to longitudinal networks one assumes that the composition of actors
is uniform across time, and if the composition is not truly uniform the authors arbitrarily
make it so by choosing a select group of actors to study. This is obviously problematic in
general and especially in the case of intrastate conflict as rebel groups often emerge and
dissolve – meaning that in time t we may have actors {i, j, k} in the network, and in time
t+1 actors {i, j, k, l} or just a different set of actors {i, j, l}. A change in composition can
occur in two ways: 1) an actor dissolves after some time, 2) an actor enters the network
after some time.
To account for these types of changes to a network, we adjust the estimation procedure
of the AME model such that actor observations only contribute to the likelihood of the
model once they enter into the network. This procedure is analogous to that adopted
by Huisman & Snijders (2003) for the stochastic actor oriented model (SAOM). They
limit the set of actors who can change their outgoing relations (or have incoming relations
changed with) to only those that are part of an active set at time t. We implement a
process for the AME framework in which composition changes are modeled as exogenous
events such that actors are allowed to enter and leave the network at fixed time points.
The utility of this approach is that the baseline probability of a tie shifts in accordance
with the number of active actors in the network at time t and the time-varying covariates
already included in the model.
The ai and bj in Equation 1 represent sender and receiver random effects that we
incorporate from the SRRM framework:
that framework would require us to either ignore important actors in the network, or treat them as if
they were present and non-violent for long periods of time.
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{(a1, b1), . . . , (an, bn)} iid∼ N(0,Σab)
{(ij, ji) : i 6= j} iid∼ N(0,Σ), where
Σab =
σ2a σab
σab σ
2
b
 Σ = σ2
1 ρ
ρ 1

(2)
The interpretation of these parameters is straightforward. The sender and receiver ran-
dom effects are modeled jointly from a multivariate normal distribution to account for
correlation in how active an actor is in sending and receiving ties. Heterogeneity in the
the sender and receiver effects is captured by σ2a and σ
2
b , respectively, and σab describes the
linear relationship between these two effects (i.e., whether actors who send [receive] a lot
of ties also receive [send] a lot of ties). Beyond these first-order dependencies, second-order
dependencies are described by σ2 and a within dyad correlation, or reciprocity, parameter
ρ.
While the additive effects from the SRRM can deal with first (differing levels of ac-
tivity across actors) and second order interdependencies (reciprocity), the multiplicative
effects are used to deal with third order dependencies. Specifically, this multiplicative
effect allows us to model homophily – the tendency of actors with similar characteris-
tics to form strong relationships than those with differing characteristics – and stochastic
equivalence, the possibility that two actors i and j will have similar relationships with
every other actor in the network. An AME model accounts for these third order effects
using the multiplicative term: α(ui,vj) = u
>
i Dvj. This model posits a latent vector of
characteristics ui and vj for each sender i and receiver j. The similarity or dissimilarity of
these vectors will then influence the likelihood of activity, and provides a representation
of third order interdependencies (Minhas et al., 2018).
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The representation of third order interdepedencies is accomplished by a process similar
to computing the singular value decomposition (SVD) of the observed network. When
taking the SVD we factorize our observed conflict network into the product of three
matrices: U,D, and V. This provides us with a low-dimensional representation of our
original conflict network in terms of third order dependence patterns arising in the net-
work. Specifically, values in U provide a representation of how stochastically equivalent
actors are as senders in a network, or more simply put how similar actors are in terms
of who they are initiating battles with. For instance, uˆi ≈ uˆj would indicate that actor
i and j initiate battles with similar third parties. V provide a similar representation but
from the perspective of how similar actors are as receivers. The values in D, a diagonal
matrix, represent levels of homophily in the network. Parameter estimation in the AME
takes place by sampling from the posterior distribution of the full conditionals.23
Results
We report the results for the sender, receiver, and dyadic covariates included in the
AME model in figure 4.24 First, we find little evidence to support the argument that
conflict in neighboring countries drives violence between actors in the Nigerian conflict
system. We also do not find that actors become particularly more violent during election
years. We do, however, find significant evidence for the argument that actors operating
across a larger region of Nigeria are likely to come into more conflict with other actors.
23Further details on the estimation procedure can be found in the Appendix.
24Excluded from these results is the dyadic variable for “both are government actors.” This is included
and has a negative effect in both models, which simply indicates that government actors are unlikely to
fight one another. Trace plots for each of these parameter estimates can be found in the appendix.
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Figure 4: Standardized parameter estimates from AME model. Points represent average value
of parameters, thicker line represents the 90% credible interval, and thinner line the 95%.
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We see a non-trivial relationship between violence against civilians and participation
in a greater number of battles. Targeting civilians is linked both to a higher likelihood
of engaging in violence against other military groups, and a higher likelihood of being
targeted by other military groups.25 Moving from the 2.5%ile of violence against civilians
to the 97.5%ile (moving from no violence to 17 attacks), while all other variables are
held at their measure of central tendency,26 increases the risk of starting a battle by the
perpetrator by a factor of about 1.58, and the risk of being targeted for a battle by about
1.55. We cannot causally say that these are the result of violence against civilians, but
the fact that the relationship holds even in a mixed-effects model (and one that accounts
for network dependencies) is suggestive. Further, anecdotal evidence maintains a similar
story. For example, the O´odua People’s Congress (OPC), an organization active in the
southwest of Nigeria organized to protect the Yoruba ethnic group, is known to engage
in two primary modes of conflict: large-scale ethnic battles that directly result in mass
casualties to both rivals and civilians, and smaller-scale episodes wherein the OPC targets
the civilian base of rival groups.
In the case of this Nigerian conflict network, there is no evidence of a link between
civilian protests and the occurrence of a conflict event. There are a number of possible
reasons for this null finding: the protest data we use might contain uncertainty about the
targets of the protest, some protests might agitate towards greater military involvement–
such as the “Bring Back Our Girls” protests pushing for the government to confront Boko
Haram–while other protests might be against violence, or different actors might respond
25This effect holds even if we leave government actors out of the network or add in binary sender and
receiver controls for government actors. See the appendix for details.
26We held whether the dyad was in the Post-Boko Haram period, the presence of neighboring conflicts,
whether it was a governmental dyad, and whether it was an election year at their median, all other
variables, as well as the random and multiplicative effects at their mean level.
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to protest in divergent ways.
Finally, we examine the effect of the Boko Haram insurgency on the level of conflict
in the system and find a clear increase in violence in the years that follow Boko Haram’s
entry.27 With all other variables held at their measure of central tendency, a battle
between any of the dyads in the system is about 2.82 times as likely in the period after
the entrance of Boko Haram as it was before their entrance. Again this is not just the
effect of Boko Haram’s propensity to target and be targeted in battles, as those first order
effects are accounted for in the AME model. The Boko Haram Insurgency is associated
with an increase in conflicts even in the dyads that do not contain Boko Haram.
We plot variance parameters from the SRRM in the bottom of figure 4. By looking
at the sender and receiver heterogeneity estimates (σ2a, σ
2
b ), we see significant first order
effects–different actors not only have different baseline levels of conflict, but the variance
changes too. We also see a moderate value for σab indicating that actors which initiate
more conflictual links also receive more conflictual links in return. Relatedly, the pos-
itive value for ρ indicates that actors whom receive a conflict from a particular sender
reciprocate that conflictual behavior. The fact that each of these variance parameters is
positive and significantly greater than zero indicates that the assumption of observational
independence relied on by standard generalized linear models (GLM) are violated in this
dyadic conflict dataset.
Boko Haram’s Entrance
In figure 5, we show that there is both more intense and more widespread conflict
with the beginning of Boko Haram’s uprising. In this visualization, we shade dyadic re-
27We find this effect to hold when estimating the model using a temporal exponential random graph
model (TERGM) as well – results are presented in the appendix. TERGMs have been used in the past
to model instance of interstate conflict (e.g., Cranmer & Desmarais, 2011).
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lationships that experience more conflict after the beginning of Boko Haram’s insurgency
in blue, those that saw less in red, and those that stay the same in green. Interestingly,
much of this conflict does not actually involve Boko Haram. Their conflict is predom-
inantly against the Nigerian Police and Military forces, and yet after their entrance we
also see increases in conflict between other groups, and in regions of the country where
Boko Haram is not present.
The uptick in conflict after 2009 is most consistent with a logic of multiple rebel groups
strategically interacting with the government. Other rebel groups are able to witness
Boko Haram’s success against the government, and this increases their beliefs that they
can challenge the government successfully (or, as Fjelde & Nilsson (2012) argue, fight each
other due to governmental weakness). At the same time, if the government is unsuccessful
against Boko Haram, they are incentivized to prove their continued effectiveness against
other groups who try to deter future challenges. After Boko Haram’s entry in 2009 we
see increased attacks between rebel groups, and increased attacks by those groups against
the government, but we also see increased attacks by the government–consistent with this
logic.
The effect of Boko Haram’s entrance underscores the need for a networked approach
to intrastate conflict. A standard approach to intrastate conflict, which focuses on the
government-rebel dyads, or in particularly ambitious cases, also looks at rebel-rebel dyads,
would capture Boko Haram’s direct effect on conflict, but it would miss this indirect effect
on the conflict system. This echoes our earlier statements in our introduction: to ignore
the interdependent nature of fighting is to misunderstand the conflict as a whole.
Network Dependencies
We use a network model to understand the Nigeria conflict system not just because
it can give more precise parameter estimates, but also because it aids in understanding
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Figure 5: Conflict network 2009-2016. Pairs with more conflict have larger links. Government
groups are in black, all other groups are in grey. Blue links indicate more interactions in the
2009-2016 period than in the 2000-2008 period, red indicates less, green no change.
the interdependencies among the actors in the network. Such an approach allows us to
infer actor relationships that are typically unobservable. We depict the sender (aˆi) and
receiver (bˆj) random effects in figure 6.
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Figure 6: Sender and receiver random effect estimates.
This figure shows which actors are more (and less) violent than would be predicted
by just accounting for the exogenous covariates we reviewed in the previous section.
We can see, for example, that Boko Haram actually has a random sender effect that
is approximately zero, implying that once we account for their high tendency to target
civilians and the secular increase in violence that followed their entry into the conflict the
model is able to accurately predict the group’s tendency towards initiating conflict. On
the other hand, actors like the Fulani and Hausa militias have notably positive sender
and receiver effects (and the Christian and Muslim Militias have notably negative effects).
This gives us cause to believe that the exogenous covariates included in the model are not
fully able to explain the behavior of these groups. The implication of this is that there are
other latent characteristics possessed by these groups that make them more likely to send
and receive conflict. At the same time, an advantage of this approach over a traditional
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GLM analysis is that we are able to easily visualize for which groups our model is falling
short.
Figure 7 shows the directions of actors’ latent factors for both sending, left panel, and
receiving violence, right panel. The directions of uˆi’s (for sending conflict) and vˆi’s (for
receiving conflict) are noted in blue and red, respectively. The size of the label assigned
to the points is a function of the magnitude of the vectors. The purpose of this figure
is to discern groups of actors that are more similar to each other in terms of whom they
send conflict to (left panel) or receive conflict from (right). Actor similarity here results
from third order dependence patterns – specifically, homophily and stochastic equivalence
– that remain after accounting for the other parameters estimated by the model.
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Figure 7: Visualization of multiplicative effects.
By using an AME approach, we are able to better identify previously unobservable
patterns of conflict in Nigeria. For example the cluster involving Boko Haram, MASSOB,
and MEND is an example of stochastic equivalence: in particular these parties, though
spatially heterogeneous, are each predominantly engaged in fighting with the Nigerian
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military and police for control of territory (the Niger Delta for MEND, the state of Biafra
for MASSOB, and the North West for Boko Haram). We also find certain groups of
actors who are not just more likely to fight common third parties, but they are also
more likely to fight each other : for prominent examples of this we can see the proximity
between the Sunni and Shiite militias, or the Christian and Muslim militias. Additionally,
groups in the bottom of figure 7 such as the Fulani, Tiv, Berom, and Kuteb militias each
tend to predominantly operate in the Middle Belt of Nigeria, and form geographically
concentrated conflict clusters in which each group initiates or receives conflict with one
another – this is an example of a set of homophilous relations.
Out-of-Sample Performance Analysis
By accounting for exogenous and network dependent patterns that generate conflict
systems we are able to better account for the data generating process underlying relational
data structures. To show that this is the case, we examine whether our approach achieves
better predictive performance in an out-of-sample context than traditional dyadic models.
Given that our model is more complex than a GLM, we would expect it to do better in-
sample, but inclusion of more parameters will only improve performance out-of-sample if
these parameters are helping us to better capture the underlying data generating process.
To evaluate our model, we use a cross-validation procedure where we randomly divide our
data into k groups, estimate model parameters without observations from a group, and
then predict those excluded observations from the estimated parameters (Minhas et al.,
2018).
We set a number of benchmarks for comparison. First we compare the AME model
to a GLM model using the same covariates to show the effect of accounting for network
dependencies on predicting conflict. We supplement this with an alternative GLM that
includes not just these covariates, but also a lagged dependent variable and a lagged
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reciprocity term.28 The lagged dependent variable is the equivalent of saying that conflict
and peace are relatively likely to persist between dyads, while the inclusion of a lagged
reciprocity term in a GLM framework is a simple way to account for retaliatory strikes.
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Figure 8: Assessments of out-of-sample predictive performance using ROC curves, separation
plots, and PR curves. AUC statistics are provided as well for both curves. In each curve, the
AME model is in blue, the GLM with lagged DV and covariates is in green, the GLM with only
covariates is in red.
We utilize three performance criterions to compare the models: Receiver Operator
Characteristic (ROC) curves, Precision Recall (PR) curves, and separation plots. ROC
curves look at the trade-off between true positive rates and false positive rates at different
thresholds of classification. ROC curves can be problematic for analyzing conflict because
conflict is relatively rare at the dyadic level. If peace is common, even a poor model will
have a very low False Positive Rate. PR curves, on the other hand, examine the trade-
offs between the percentage of conflicts a model predicts, and the percentage of predicted
conflicts which occur. Lastly, we use separation plots to provide an intuitive visualization
28In the appendix, we also show that our approach outperforms a random forest classifier in its ability
to predict conflictual events out-of-sample.
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of the accuracy of our predictions. All of the models’ performance out-of-sample by these
metrics are displayed in figure 8. The AME model with covariates is the best performing
model out-of-sample in all cases. This model outperforms each of the GLM variants by a
notable margin.29
Discussion: Intrastate Conflict as a Dynamic Network
Intrastate conflicts are often more complex than Manichaean struggles between the
government and a unified opposition. More and more, they involve a number of actors
operating in an environment where interactions are interdependent. In the case of Nigeria,
our network approach does better at predicting “who fights whom and when” out-of-
sample than extant approaches. The improved predictive performance of our network
approach is a result of the fact that there is significant network based structure underlying
the Nigerian conflict system. Importantly, this network structure is more than just a useful
part of our modeling approach; it actually helps to explain who fights who during conflict.
In our study, first order dependencies reveal that ethnic-militias in central Nigeria are
more violent than expected. Specifically, the Fulani militia is particularly more active in
engaging in battles than the exogenous sender, receiver, and dyadic variables in our model
would predict. This highlights the opportunity for further research into understanding
what latent attributes may drive such inflated conflictual behavior. Second order effects,
such as reciprocity, also reveal important insights. The presence of reciprocity in battles,
and the consistent relationship between civilian victimization and conflict, confirm our
expectation that the interactions between actors matter at least as much as their mere
29We also test model forecasting ability temporally by dividing the data into a training and test set,
where the test set corresponds to the last period in the dataset that we have available. Results for this
analysis are shown in the appendix and here again we find that our network based approach has better
out-of-sample predictive performance than alternative approaches.
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characteristics. Further our visualization of the multiplicative effects captures third order
dependencies and shows strong evidence that actors in this system form various commu-
nities of conflict. Each of these dependencies points to the fact that there is an underlying
structure to the set of dyadic interactions that we observe in this network even after ac-
counting for the effects of exogenous covariates. Since these patterns play a role in the
data-generating process of intrastate conflict, our approach out-performs more traditional
frameworks that ignore such dependencies.
Additionally, because we are able to estimate a network model in which actor com-
position changes over time, we can assess the impact that particular actors such as Boko
Haram have on the system. We find that the entrance of this single actor profoundly
influenced the occurrence of battles across the system. Boko Haram’s entrance does not
simply increase conflict directly, it also is associated with a marked rise in violence in the
dyads that do not include Boko Haram.
A limitation of this study, however, is that this is a network analysis of a single conflict.
For example, our findings that civilian riots and protests affect the course of a conflict are
not necessarily generalizable to cases beyond Nigeria and the specific time span studied
here. To investigate the cross-national implications of our findings we need an approach
that accounts for the fact that conflict networks can span multiple countries over time.
In future work, we will build on extant tensor based network approaches to explore the
affect of exogenous covariates across multiple countries (e.g., Boccaletti et al., 2014; Schein
et al., 2015; Minhas et al., 2016).
Conclusion
These contributions are not without their limitations. While our study affirms the
utility of ACLED data efforts, more actor-level characteristics are needed to fully engage
the rich literature on civil war dynamics. Such data would enable even more precise in-
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vestigation of covariates of interest for determining changes in rebel group behavior over
time. Second, though our study has revealed meaningful findings with respect to key
covariates such as civilian victimization, more research is needed to explore the generaliz-
ability of such results. Even after controlling for network related dependencies within this
system, we find that actors who target civilians are more likely to receive and send conflict
themselves. Relatedly, we find little evidence that civilian led protest against a particular
actor changes that actor’s likelihood in initiating conflict. The findings with regards to
the role of civilian victimization and civilian riots/protests might not generalize beyond
the Nigerian case. Nigeria may be unique for several reasons, its 150 million people are
divided almost equally between Muslims and Christians. Further, Nigerians split into
even finer divisions based on tribe, of which there are over 200 in the country. Future
research should compare and contrast these findings beyond the Nigerian case to better
illuminate the networked nature of civilian mobilization in conflict environments. We
hope this study motivates future work that more fully considers the relationship between
the behavior of armed actors and civilian behavior in complex settings.
Similarly, while our study has found consistent evidence that the entrance of Boko
Haram altered the trajectory of the Nigerian conflict, more research is needed to fully
understand the effects of group entry. This future research agenda is two-fold. First, we
need to understand the decision of armed actors to join an ongoing civil conflict, why they
enter and how they differ from groups willing to start a civil conflict. More importantly,
we need to understand why some actors have stronger effects on shaping interactions
across a network than others. Doing so will allow us to understand when the entrance of
a particular group is going to destabilize a network or greatly escalate the level of violence.
Our study has embraced the complexity of multi-actor conflicts, rather than discounted
it. We have shown that network dynamics help explain the occurrence of violence between
groups over time, even as actors enter and exit the conflict. We have demonstrated how
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key, violent actors can increase violence across the network system. Additionally, our
approach achieves a longstanding goal of conflict studies: to accurately predict violence
over time. And, importantly, our study offers meaningful insights into how conflict schol-
ars can effectively pair methodological innovations in the study of interdependence and
network analysis to expand our understanding of civil conflict.
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